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Abstract
Breaches of the security of personal data collected by firms are reported almost daily.
Companies are under an increasing political pressure to notify individuals whose privacy
as been breached. At the moment, we know virtually nothing about the behavioral impact
of data breach notifications. We present the results of an experimental study designed to
investigate how breach notifications change the individual’s propensity to provide sensitive
personal information to firms. In contrast to the theory (where breach notifications have no
behavioral effect), our main result shows that notifications induce a sub-group of individuals
to disclose less information to a firm, i.e. those with personally sensitive information.
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1 Introduction
Breaches of security of personal data collected by companies are reported almost daily. These
breaches occur due to hacker attacks or improper data handling practices.
A 2015 report identifies 79,790 data breaches in 70 contributing companies, which led to a
loss of a staggering number of 750 million records (Verizon (2015)). Yet, most victimized indi-
viduals seem to ignore data breaches. The Ponemon Institute in the U.S. reports that – based
upon estimates by the managements of the affected firms – only 2-4 percent of customers ter-
minate their contractual relationship after receiving a data breach notification. One explanation
of this puzzle could be that customers do not regard the resulting damage as great enough
to change their behavior. Another is that consumers are numb considering the frequency and
number of breaches reported in the news.
Even if consumers seem to have few concerns about violations of personal data, there is an
increasing pressure on firms by policymakers in the U.S. and the European Union to report data
breaches. In the U.S., an increasing number of states have enacted breach notification laws. In
Europe, on the other hand, in 2009 the European Commission (EC) introduced a notification
obligation for telecoms and Internet Service Providers (E-privacy Directive). The EC is now
discussing if the scope of reporting should be expanded to all sectors.
Despite the extent of the problem, there is currently no rigorous research about the behav-
ioral impact of data breaches. This void motivates our work. Our main objective is to inves-
tigate how data breach notifications affect the individual’s behavior regarding disclosure of
sensitive personal data. We present a novel experiment where the experimental subjects play a
two-period lottery with their personal information. First, the participants conduct a logic test
with questions from an IQ test and each individual is privately informed, if her test result is
above or below the median of the group in the laboratory. In each of the two subsequent peri-
ods, an individual can decide to sell her name and the test result (i.e., if the test result is above
or below the median) in order to obtain a shopping voucher at a discounted price. The name
and the test result are denoted as “personal information.”1 After each period, chance determines
whether a data breach has occurred or not. A data breach does not automatically lead to public
disclosure of the personal information generated. This happens only if - at the end of the exper-
iment - another random draw selects exactly the period in which the data was sold and a breach
has occurred. In that case, the name and the test result of the individual are disclosed to the
whole group in the laboratory (i.e., a ‘privacy shock’ happens). We run two treatments that differ
only in the information individuals receive at the end of each period: in the Notification treat-
ment individuals are informed whether or not a data breach has occurred, in the No Notification
1The name and test result constitute personal information as defined by the EU Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC, where it is stated that personal data is any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person.
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treatment individuals do not receive any type of information. Note that in both treatments, the
choice of selling their information is up to the participants, who have to balance if the benefits
of a disclosure (i.e. the discount on the voucher) compensates for the perceived costs that arise
from the potential diffusion of the information (i.e., the likely privacy costs).
Under the assumption that a privacy shock affects negatively the individual utility (if and
only if the test result is below the median), economic theory predicts that: i) individuals with a
test result above the median sell their personal information in both periods; ii) individuals with
a test result below the median sell their personal information if and only if the discount is large
enough; and iii) a data breach notification does not affect these decisions.
Our main results are the following: we observe that individuals with a test result below the
median tend to be less likely to sell their personal information compared to individuals with
a test result above the median. This empirical result confirms that the personal information
generated in the laboratory (i.e., the test result tied to the name of the individual) is regarded as
sensitive primarily by those that are below the median. Individuals with a test result below the
median are less likely to sell their information in the second period, in particular after receiving
the message that a data breach had occurred. This result suggests that the notification sensitizes
individuals with a test result below the median. Finally, we find that a message stating that a
data breach did not happen does not affect the decision to sell personal information.
Concerns about the diffusion of private/personal information are studied by Acquisti and
Grossklags (2007), Huberman et al. (2005) and Beresford et al. (2012), among others.
Huberman et al. (2005) designed an experiment to elicit the value people place on their pri-
vate data (their weight and age). Their subjects participated in a reverse second-price auction:
the individual demanding the least price was paid the second-lowest bid price and in exchange
of the revelation of the weight or age information to the other participants. While the informa-
tion was verified, participants in this experiment remained anonymous. The main result is that
the less socially desirable the revealed weight or age information was (compared to the group’s
average), the greater the price that a person demanded for releasing it. Acquisti and Grossklags
(2007) investigate the gap between the willingness to sell and the willingness to protect personal
information.2 The authors generated a quiz score and recorded the weight of the experimental
subjects. They then offered their participants the opportunity either to protect this information
against the release to the other participants of the group or to sell this information and have it
released to the group. Their main result is that individuals almost always choose to sell their
information and almost never elect to protect their information even for small payments. Beres-
ford et al. (2012) explore the willingness-to-pay for privacy in a field experiment. Participants
were confronted with two identical stores that differed only in the information requested, as
one shop requested more sensitive information (i.e., personal income). In the treatment where
the prices of the stores were equal, individuals bought from both stores equally often, whereas
2Individuals sell their information for some amount z, but are not willing to protect it for the same amount z.
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in the treatment where prices differed by one Euro, all participants chose the cheaper store,
although it required personal income information.
Our research is related to these experiments as they use some kind of personal information
to investigate how people evaluate it under different conditions: the first paper and the third
paper use pre-existing information connected to an individual, the second one creates personal
information by using a test score (as in our design). However, our work differs from these stud-
ies with regard to the main research question: the effect of a breach notification on the choice of
personal information disclosure. In principle we could use the setup of Huberman et al. (2005)
to investigate the effect of breach notification, by looking at how the evaluation of the personal
information changes after the notification of a privacy breach. But we preferred to implement
the disclosure of personal information for a fixed price as this is the way of transaction in many
realistic situations.
Our work differs from these literatures in other aspects as well. First, we communicate
to each participant, if her test is above or below the median of the group. This way we are
able to classify individuals according to their potential concern about the diffusion of their
information. In the cited studies the experimenter does not provide any information regarding
the recorded characteristics of the group (mean, median or other statistics), although the self-
perception regarding the sensitivity of the collected data is recorded through a questionnaire.
By dividing the group of participants into two sub-groups (i.e., individuals with a test result
above and those with one below the median), we increase the privacy concerns of some of our
participants, as this allows for a social comparison among participants (see Azmat and Iriberri
(2010)). A second key feature of our design is that participants do not remain anonymous,
but are identified with their real name. The real name as well as the test result is verified by
the experimenter, which introduces stronger privacy concerns compared to situations, where
information is not tied to the real name. The third - and perhaps most important - feature of
our experimental design is that the sale of personal information does not automatically lead to
its disclosure at the end of the experiment. This feature allows us to use a two-period design3
that is key in order to study the behavioral impact of a data breach notification.4
Other experiments study how identification of participants affects the behavior in Dictator
Games (DG), Ultimatum Games (UG), Trust Games and Prisoner’s Dilemmas (PD). For exam-
ple, Frey and Bohnet (1997) and Bohnet and Frey (1999) demonstrate that removing anonymity
increases “solidarity” among participants (i.e., the caring about the others’ welfare). In these
3If the sale of personal information automatically leads to its disclosure after a privacy breach, the reserve price
of the information goes to zero in the second period. It is ’burned’ so to say and individuals would always sell it,
because it is already lost.
4In a two-period setup, we are able to analyze the sale decision of an individual, who has been informed about
a breach notification. The reason is that after a breach notification, the personal information is not automatically
lost. It is only lost, once a shock co-incidentially also occurs. The reader is referred to the enclosed instructions for
details.
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experiments, the interaction in the PD situation under conditions of identification leads to a
higher cooperation rate compared to a situation of anonymity. In DG identification leads to a
greater allocation of monetary amounts to the counterpart. Identification in these experiments
is implemented by participants either standing up in the class, by looking at each other in si-
lence or by announcing names and hobbies. Similarly, Charness and Gneezy (2008) consider the
effect of revealing the family name of a participant’s counterpart in DG and UG. They find that
in the DG the revelation of the name of the recipient results in more generous allocations, while
in the UG it has no significant effect. These experiments highlight the impact of identification of
the participants on their interactions with other individuals. While these experiments highlight
how identification of participants affects the interactions between individuals, our design does
not consider interaction among participants, i.e. the decision to sell personal information does
not affect the payoff of the others.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the design of the experiment and
the theoretical predictions; section 3 describes the main results and section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
This experiment is designed to study the impact of privacy breach notifications on individual
behavior. The experiment consists of two parts: the first is used to create sensitive personal
information, the second part is used to study the decisions that individuals make with respect
to their personal data. In the first part of the experiment, subjects took a logic test. It consisted
of 22 questions drawn from an IQ test, which had to be answered within 17 minutes. For each
correct answer, participants earned 30 Euro cents (up to a maximum of 6.60 Euros). At the end
of the test, individuals were privately informed about their test result and whether they were
above or below the median of the session (the exact message read: “You belong to the upper 50
percent of the group” in the case of an above-median result). We assume that individuals with
a test result below the median have concerns with respect to the diffusion of this information to
the other participants. Indeed there is evidence that results of a logic test create sensitivity in an
academic environment. For example Azmat and Iriberri (2010) show that students care about
social comparisons, once they can observe whether others are performing better or worse than
the class average. Note that IQ tests have already been used in the laboratory environment,
see for example Ariely and Norton (2005). We do not use personal financial or health informa-
tion for two reasons: First, its truthfulness needs to be verified, otherwise subjects may simply
lie about it, and secondly, real financial or health data can be used by other participants for
illegal purposes. Our experimental design needed to undergo review of the Berliner Data Pro-
tection Officer (an official state institution) and we needed to limit the usage possibilities of the
disclosed data, while at the same time creating sensitivity in order to obtain a privacy concern.
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The second part of the experiment consisted of two periods. In each period participants
could decide whether to purchase a real shopping voucher from a firm or not. The voucher
was for a well-known multi-media store in Berlin with a face value of 4 Euros, but was offered
at a price of 3 Euros to the subjects. This price could be further reduced to 1 Euro, if subjects
provided the information about the position of their test result respect to the median of the
session (either above or below) and their name to the experimenter.5 The participants had
three options: (1) to provide (or disclose) their personal information (name and test result with
respect to the median of the session) to the experimenter in order to purchase the voucher at
the reduced price of 1 Euro; (2) to purchase the voucher at its offered price (3 Euro) under
conditions of anonymity; (3) to not purchase the voucher at all.
The personal information provided to the experimenter was subject to the risk of being
revealed to all participants according to the following procedure. In each period, a data breach
occurred with the probability of .5. The probability was independently determined for each
individual and period.
This breach, though, did not automatically lead to the revelation of the personal informa-
tion to the group. The intuition is that data leaks do not always automatically lead to a realized
damage for individuals. If a breach would have led to revelation, all individuals would have
sold their information after the first breach. To avoid this effect, we implemented a random
draw at the end of the second period (which was independently determined for each individ-
ual), which selected one of the two shopping periods. If the individual purchased the voucher
at a reduced price in that selected period, and a data breach had occurred as well, the personal
information provided in that period by the individual was revealed to all participants at the
end of the session (so-called ’privacy shock’).
At the end of the experiment, each subject’s payment appeared on the screen. The subject
had to write this payment on the receipt. The experimenter checked whether the correct pay-
ment was put in, and whether there was the correct name on the payment receipt. The name
was verified by checking an official identity document (identity card or student card), which all
participants of laboratory experiments at German universities have to bring. After the verifica-
tion stage, the name and test result (i.e. being above or below the median) of those who chose to
sell their personal information, and for whom the privacy shock had realized, was read aloud
to the group by the experimenter.
We implemented two treatments in a total of 13 sessions: The first treatment was denoted
as No Notification, and was exactly the procedure explained above. The second treatment, de-
5To create a realistic exercise, in the game participants sold their information to a computerized firm. The value
of the discount had been determined upfront through several privacy auctions we conducted. These were reverse
Vickrey auctions run with different participants, who could sell their name and test result by submitting bids. The
participant, who submitted the lowest bid, won the auction, but received the amount of the second lowest bid as
payment. The results from these auctions are available from the authors upon request.
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noted as Notification, is identical to the No Notification treatment except that all individuals, who
bought a voucher obtained at the end of each period a message whether a breach had happened
or not (i.e. either the message: ’A privacy breach has occurred’ or the message ’No privacy breach
has occurred’. In the following these messages are denoted by Breach Message and No Breach
Message).
Table (1) gives an overview of the treatments and notification procedures. Note that the
realization of a data breach is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a privacy shock. This
setup maintains the sensitivity of the information in the second period, even after a data breach
has occurred in the first period (i.e. the information is not ‘burned’ after the first data breach).6
In order to make this setup easy to understand for the subjects, we explained the privacy breach
and shock with different case in the instructions (see the Table included in the instructions).
Based on the theoretical analysis reported in the Appendix, we briefly summarize the pre-
dictions for each treatment. In the No Notification treatment, subjects with a test result above the
median sell their personal information, while subjects with a test result below the median sell
their personal information only if the premium (price reduction) is sufficiently large to com-
pensate for the disutility arising from a possible privacy shock. If the premium is too small,
these subjects will prefer not sell their personal information.
In the Notification treatment the breach notification has no effects on the individuals’ incen-
tive to sell personal information.
The experiment was run between June and August 2012 at Technical University of Berlin
laboratory to which the participants were invited. This invitation was neutral in order to not
prime subjects on the issue of privacy. Altogether 228 subjects participated in a total of 13
sessions. The individuals were seated in booths with no possibility to visually or verbally com-
municate with each another. Each session lasted for less than one hour and did not start until
all participants were familiar with the experimental procedures. In order to check the compre-
hension of the experimental procedures, subjects solved various exercises. The average payoff
from the experiment was about 6 Euro in cash and 4 Euro in vouchers. The software used for
programming of the game was z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)). The translation of the in-
struction from the original German version into English is included in the Appendix at the end
of the paper.
3 Experimental Results
Table (2) describes the dataset. The main descriptive statistics are reported by treatment. Al-
most half of the subjects decided to disclose their personal information in order to buy the
voucher at the discounted price. A negligible number of subjects decided to buy the voucher
6At an ex-ante stage the probability of a privacy shock affecting the first period is 0.25. After the notification of
no breach the probability of a privacy shock affecting the first period is zero and 0.5 if a data breach is notified.
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without discount, i.e. anonymously. There are not significant differences in the relative frequen-
cies of information disclosure across periods and treatments (variables Disclosure 1st period and
Disclosure 2nd period). At first glance, there is no significant treatment effect.
Table (3) reports the relative frequencies of information disclosure for the first period by
treatment and test results (above or below the median). The top part of table (4) reports the dif-
ferences in the relative frequencies of information disclosure between treatments by test result,
along with the associated t-test, pr-test and Mann-Whitney test.7 All these differences fail to
be significant. Therefore, there is no evidence of a treatment effect in period 1, i.e. the notifi-
cation device does not enhance the disclosure of personal information. The bottom part of table
(4) reports the differences in the disclosure behavior between individuals with test result above
the median and those with test result below the median by treatment. All these differences
are negative and significant (-23.2 % and -34.8% respectively in the No Notification and Notifica-
tion treatment). This result supports the assumption that the information we generated in the
laboratory is sensitive, especially for individuals with a test result below the median.
RESULT 1: Individuals with a test result below the median disclose their per-
sonal information less frequently compared to individuals with a test result above
the median. The presence of a data breach notification does not affect the disclosure
behavior in the first period.
Note that the first part of this result is in line with previous research on privacy showing that
the less socially desirable the revealed personal information is, the greater is the price a person
demands (e.g. Huberman et al. (2005)). Consistent with this observation, we find that individ-
uals with a less desirable test result (i.e., they are below the median) are less likely to disclose
this information for a fixed discount. The second part of the result can be interpreted in a way
that the presence of a data breach notification (subjects were informed upfront through the in-
structions) does not improve the confidence of individuals in the first period, i.e. at an ex-ante
stage.
To study the effect of the notification messages, we analyze the decisions taken in the second
period. We further classify individuals by means of dummy variables according to the treat-
ment, the action taken in the first period (i.e., did not buy a voucher, bought a voucher), the
type of message received (i.e. Breach Message, No Breach Message) and their test result (above
or below the median).8 For example, with D5 we denote the category of individuals who par-
ticipated in the No Notification treatment (i.e. treatment=0), did not buy a voucher in the first
period (buy=0) and had test results above the median (i.e., below=0). The categories D6, ..., D14
7The first two are parametric tests for mean-comparisons, which are suited for large samples (n>100) and bino-
mial variable, respectively. The latter is a non-parametric test on the equality of two distributions.
8In this analysis, we combine individuals who bought a voucher under the condition of anonymity (case 2 on
p. 6) with those who bought the voucher providing their personal information (case 1 on p. 6) as they are too few
(less than 2% see Table (2)).
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classify individuals in a similar manner. For each of these categories, Table (5) reports the sam-
ple probability of observing an individual purchasing the voucher at a reduced price in the
second period (i.e. disclosing her personal information in the second period). For example, for
individuals belonging to category D5 the probability of disclosing personal information in period
2 is 0.145.
Table (6) reports the differences in the probability of disclosing personal information in the sec-
ond period between different categories together with t-test, pr-test and Mann-Whitney. The
top part of the table highlights the effect of the messages on the decision of disclosure in the
second period by comparing the behavior of individuals with the same test result, who bought
the voucher in period 1, but participated in different treatments. The only difference between
two categories was whether the individuals received a data breach notification (if they partic-
ipated in the notification treatment) or not. For example, the effect of the Breach Message on
individuals with a test result above the median is given in the first row of the top part of Table
(6) by the difference in the probabilities of disclosing personal information in the second period
between categories D11 and D6. This gives us the between-treatment effect of the message for
individuals, who bought a voucher in the first period (i.e. buy=1) and who have a test result
above the median (i.e. below=0). Similarly, we compute the effect of the Breach Message for
individuals with a test result below the median (below=1, see D13 − D8), and the effects of the
variable No Breach Message for individuals with a test result above the median (D12 − D6) as
well as for those with a test below the median (D14 − D8).
We find that the effect of the Breach Message on individuals with test result below the median
is negative and significant. After receiving a Breach Message these individuals are about 50% less
likely to disclose their personal information in the second period compared to individuals in the
same position and participating in the No Notification treatment. On the contrary, the effect
of the No Breach Message (i.e. individuals were informed that no breach had occurred) has no
significant impact on the behavior of these individuals.
RESULT 2: The No Breach Message has no effect on the disclosure of personal in-
formation of individuals. The Breach Message significantly reduces the probability to
disclose personal information for individuals with a test result below the median, but
not for individuals with a test result above.
Note that this result is based upon a comparison between sessions and shows that a No Breach
Message does not improve the confidence of individuals while the Breach Message reduces the
confidence of below-median subjects.
The bottom part of Table (6) highlights the effect of the messages on the disclosure decision
in the second period comparing the behavior of individuals participating in the Notification
Treatment. We now focus on the effect of receiving the different types of messages. Note that we
cannot compare individuals that received a message with individuals that received no message,
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as these are two qualitatively different situations. So the first two rows of the bottom part of
the table report the difference in the probability of disclosure between individuals that received
two different types of messages and with a test result above the median (first row, D11 − D12) or
below the median (second row, D13 − D14). We observe that subjects with a test result below
the median are less likely to disclose their information in the second period, after they have
received a Breach Message compared to the situation of receiving a No Breach Message. This
effect is negative (-44%) and significant (at 10% level). For above-median subjects, this effect is
also negative, but it is smaller and not significant.
Finally, we compare the differences in the disclosure probability of below-median individ-
uals with above-median individuals conditional on receiving a given type of message. After a
Breach Message the probability of disclosing personal information is remarkably lower for below-
median individuals in comparison to above-median subjects (-60% significant at 1% level). The
same effect conditional on receiving a No Breach Message is smaller (-22% significant at 5% level).
RESULT 3: In the second period, individuals with a test result below the me-
dian disclose less compared to those above the median. This difference is remark-
ably larger after a Breach Message. The probability to disclose personal information for
below-median individuals is smaller after a Breach Message compared to after a No
Breach Message. This effect is not observable for individuals with a test result above
the median.
These results suggest that the existence of a notification procedure does not enhance the trust
of individuals with sensitive personal information (i.e., with a test result below the median)
when receiving a No Breach Message. On the contrary, both within- and between-treatment
comparisons suggest a negative effect of the Breach Message on the rate of disclosure of personal
information of below-median individuals.
4 Conclusions
In a laboratory setting, we investigated the effects of data breach notifications on the disclosure
behavior of individuals with respect to personal information during an economic transaction
with a firm and under the risk of a privacy shock. The personal information we used is repre-
sented by the name of a subject and the result (i.e., whether a subject was above or below the
median of the group) of a logical test implemented at the beginning of the experiment. Partic-
ipants could sell this personal information in two subsequent “shopping periods” to a firm in
order to obtain a voucher at a discounted price. This setup is unique and represents a novel
approach compared to previous research.
We present three key results. The first is that individuals who pass a social comparison with
a negative outcome (i.e., they are below the median of the group) are less likely to disclose
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this information in both treatments and periods. This result is line with other research, which
highlights that test results are regarded as a sensitive information in an academic environment,
because students care about social comparisons (e.g. Azmat and Iriberri (2010)). Moreover, it
is aligned with privacy research showing that the less socially desirable the information is, the
higher is the price asked for by subjects who sell this information (e.g. Huberman et al. (2005)).
The second key result is that once below-median individuals receive a breach notification, they
are less likely to disclose their data in the next period. The third result is that a No Breach
Message does not have any discernible difference, i.e., it does not improve the trust in the firm
receiving the personal information. The results from this experiment suggest that a notification
procedure will have a significant behavioral effect only on a sub-group of consumers, i.e., those
individuals who regard their information as personally sensitive. If this group is not relatively
large in the market place, data notification breaches might not be an effective policy tool to
increase data security in firms.
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A Appendix: Theoretical Predictions
In this section we derive the theoretical predictions for the experimental design. All probabil-
ities and procedures to realize a privacy shock are explained in section 2. In the following the
action of selling the personal information is named disclosure (of the personal information)
Let τi ∈ {vi,bad, vi,good}, where vi,bad ≤ vi,good, be the value that the subject i assigns to the
evaluation of her ability (in the test) by the others, i.e. vi,bad (vi,good) is the value that she adds
to her utility when others know that her test was below (above) the median. In the following
we consider the case where vi,bad = −vi,good = −1. By abuse of notation we denote by τi the
type of the subject i where -1 means that her test result was below the median and 1 means
that her test result was above the median. In each of the two periods individuals decide to
provide the position of their test result with respect to the median in exchange of a prize d.
Let si,1 ∈ [0, 1] be the probability by which subject i will disclose her personal information in
period 1 and si,2,a∈ [0, 1] where a ∈ {0, 1} be the probability by which subject i will disclose her
personal information in period 2 where a = 0 denotes disclosure in period 1 and a = 1 denotes no
disclosure in period 1. By si = {si,1, si,2,0, si,2,1} we denote the behavioral strategy of individual
i, by s−i the set of strategies of all subjects different from i and by s the set of strategies of all
subjects.
At the end of the game the utility of an individual i depends on the decisions to sell or not
the personal information and the realization of privacy shocks. After the realization of privacy
shocks, every individual updates her beliefs about the type of subjects not affected by privacy
shocks. Let bij denote the probability individual i assigns to the event τj = 1 for all individuals j
not affected by privacy shock i.e. bij = Pr
(
τj = 1|npsj
)
where npsj denotes the event ’individual
j had no privacy shock’. Then, using the Bayes rule we can compute this probability as follows:
bij = Pr
(
τj = 1|npsj
)
=
#
(
nps&τj = 1
)
#
(
nps&τj = 1
)
+ #
(
nps&τj = −1
)
where #
(
nps&τj = 1
)
and #
(
nps&τj = −1
)
denote the number of individuals with τj = 1,
respectively τj = −1, and not affected by privacy shocks. We assume that second order beliefs
are equal to first order beliefs and we denote them by bi.
Let βi ≥ 0 be a sensitivity parameter of subject i concerning the revelation of her personal
information to the other participants and γi ≥ 0 be a sensitivity parameter (of subject i) applied
to the second order beliefs (i.e. beliefs on the beliefs that others have on the subject i when her
type is not revealed). Her utility at the end of the game is (when privacy shocks are realized):
ui (τi) = #d + [βiτi]
I + [γi (2bi − 1)]I−1
where I is an indicator variable taking value 1 if individual i was affected by a privacy shock
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otherwise it takes value 0, # is the number of times she disclosed her information. Given that
we are interested in decisions taken before the realizations of the privacy shocks, we need to
consider the individual i ex-ante utility. To compute it we need to define:
1. the expectations of bi over all possible realizations of #
(
nps&τj = 1
)
and for a given strat-
egy profile s, i.e.bei,s = E (bi), i.e. Note that b
e
i,0 ≤ bei,s ≤ bei,1 where bei,1 is the value that
it takes when all subjects disclose their personal information in both periods and bei,0is the
value it takes when all subjects with τi = −1 do not disclose their personal information and
those with τi = 1 disclose in both periods.
2. The individual i’s the probability to face a privacy shock as function of her strategy si, i.e.
p(si) = 14 (si,1 (1+ si,2,1 − si,2,0) + si,2,0)
Given a strategy profile s = (si, s−i), the expected utility of individual i when her type is τi ∈
{0, 1}, is:
uei (si, s−i, τi) = d (si,1 (1+ si,2,1 − si,2,0) + si,2,0) + p(si)βiτi + (1− p(si))
(
γibei,s − γi
(
1− bei,s
))
where the first term is the discount(s) subjects receive when selling their personal information,
the second term is related to the (dis)utility arising from the realization of a privacy shock at the
end of the game, and the last one is the (dis)utility due to other beliefs in the case of no privacy
shock occurring at the end.
Now consider the case, where βi = γi = β for all i and concentrate the attention on symmet-
ric strategies. In the treatment without notification, subjects behave according to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1.
1. For all i with τi = 1 si = {1, x, 1}x ∈ [0, 1] (full disclosure).
2. For all i with τi = −1 there exist values d” > d′ such that:
(a) if d ≤ d′ then si = {0, 0, y}y ∈ [0, 1] (no disclosure)
(b) if d ≥ d” then si = {1, z, 1}z ∈ [0, 1] if d ≥ d” (full disclosure)
(c) if d′ < d < d” thensi = {x1, x2, x3}, x1, x2, x3 ∈ [0, 1] , x1 + x2 > 0, x1+, x3 < 2 (partial
disclosure).
Proof. Part 1. The result for individuals with τi = 1 directly follows by the consideration
that their expected utility is increasing in the probability of the privacy shock. It is directly
verifiable that si = {1, x, 1} is maximizing the probability of privacy shock for any value of x.
Then in the following we will use that si = {1, x, 1} ∀ i s.t. τi = 1.
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Part 2. Then we can focus our attention on individuals with τi = −1. To keep notation sim-
ple, we denote by uei (si,1, si,2,0, si,2,1) the expected utility of individual i of type τi = −1, playing
strategy si = {si,1, si,2,0, si,2,1} and given the strategies s−i of other players. This expected utility
is uei (si,1, si,2,0, si,2,1) = d (si,1 (1+ si,2,1 − si,2,0) + si,2,0)− p(si)β+(1− p(si))
(
βbei,s − β
(
1− bei,s
))
where p(si) = 14 (si,1 (1+ si,2,1 − si,2,0) + si,2,0). Replacing p(si) we get:
uei (si,1, si,2,0, si,2,1) = d (si,1 (1+ si,2,1 − si,2,0) + si,2,0)+ β
(
2bei,s
(
1− 1
4
(si,1 (1+ si,2,1 − si,2,0) + si,2,0)
)
− 1
)
We claim that, given a strategy profile sˆ, the incentives to disclose personal information for
an individual with τi = −1 are equal across periods and, in period 2 do not depend on
what was her choice in period 1. Given a strategy profile sˆ the incentives to disclose in pe-
riod 1 are given by uei (1, si,2,0, si,2,1) − uei (0, si,2,0, si,2,1) where uei (1, si,2,0, si,2,1) = d (1+ si,2,1) +
β
(
2bei,sˆ
(
1− 14 (1+ si,2,1)
)
− 1
)
, uei (0, si,2,0, si,2,1) = dsi,2,0 + β
(
2bei,sˆ
(
1− 14 si,2,0
)
− 1
)
.
Agent i will disclose if and only if uei (1, si,2,0, si,2,1)− uei (0, si,2,0, si,2,1) = d (1+ si,2,1 − si,2,0)−
β 12 b
e
i,sˆ (1+ si,2,1 − si,2,0) ≥ 0 that is true when d ≥ β 12 bei,sˆ. In period 2 when in period 1 personal
information was disclosed, agent i will disclose if and only if uei (1, si,2,0, 1) − uei (1, si,2,0, 0) ≥ 0
where uei (1, si,2,0, 1) = 2d+ β
(
bei,sˆ − 1
)
, uei (1, si,2,0, 0) = d+ β
(
bei,sˆ
3
2 − 1
)
. Solving the inequality
we find that it happens when d ≥ 12βbei,sˆ. In period 2 (when in period 1 personal information
was not disclosed), agent i will disclose if and only if uei (0, 1, si,2,1) − uei (0, 0, si,2,1) ≥ 0 where
uei (0, 1, si,2,1) = d + β
(
3
2 b
e
i,sˆ − 1
)
, uei (0, 0, si,2,1) = β
(
2bei,sˆ − 1
)
. Solving the inequality we find
that it happens when d ≥ 12βbei,sˆ. This proves the claim.
Case (a). Suppose that d ≤ 12βbei,0 = d′. Assume a strategy profile sˆ where individuals
with τi = 1 disclose their personal information in both periods and agents with τi = −1 are
characterized by some level of disclosure of personal information (i.e. si,1 + si,2,0 > 0 ). Then
bei,sˆ > b
e
i,0 and d <
1
2βb
e
i,sˆ. As a consequence of the previous claim, strategy profile sˆ cannot be an
equilibrium, because agents with τi = −1 strictly prefer to not disclose. It directly follows that
there is an unique equilibrium strategy profile that has to be characterized by no disclosure of
personal information, i.e. si = {0, 0, y}y ∈ [0, 1] for all i.
Case (b). Suppose that d ≥ 12βbei,1 = d”. Assume a strategy profile sˆ where individuals
with τi = 1 disclose their personal information in both periods and agents with τi = −1 are
characterized by partial disclosure of personal information (i.e. si,1 + 1, si,2,1 < 2 ). Then bei,sˆ <
bei,1 and d >
1
2βb
e
i,sˆ. As a consequence of the previous claim, strategy profile sˆ cannot be an
equilibrium, because agents with τi = −1 strictly prefer to disclose. It directly follows that
there is an unique equilibrium strategy profile that has to be characterized by full disclosure of
personal information, i.e. si = {1, y, 1}y ∈ [0, 1] for all i.
Case (c). Suppose d′ < d < d”. A strategy profile sˆ where si = {1, y, 1}y ∈ [0, 1] for all i with
τi = −1 cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, by assumption d < d” = 12βbei,1 and the previous
15
claim, there is incentive to not disclose. A strategy profile sˆ where si = {0, 0, y}y ∈ [0, 1] for
all i with τi = −1 cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, by assumption d > d′ = 12βbei,0 and the
previous claim, there is an incentive to disclose. QED.
Participants in the Notification treatment receive a message at the end of period 1, which
notifies them about the realization of a data breach. They can receive two types of message:
’A privacy breach has occurred’ and the message ’No privacy breach has occurred’. The presence
of notification causes a larger set of strategies, because in the second period individuals can
condition their action on the message they received. Indeed a strategy has to state the actions to
undertake in period 1 and in period 2, a) after no disclosure in period 1 and breach notification,
b) after no disclosure in period 1 and no breach notification, and c) after disclosure in period
1 and breach notification, and finally d) after disclosure in period 1 and no breach notification.
Let si,1 ∈ [0, 1] be the probability by which subject i will disclose her personal information in
period 1 and let si,2,a,b ∈ [0, 1], a, b ∈ {0, 1}, be the probabilities by which subject i will disclose
her personal information in period 2 where a = 0 (a = 1) denotes no disclosure (disclosure) in
period 1 and b = 0 (b = 1) denotes no data breach (data breach) in period 1. Then we denote the
strategy of subject i by si = {si,1, si,2,0,0, si,2,0,1, si,2,1,0, si,2,1,1}, where the five arguments are the
disclosure probabilities in the five information sets described above. In this treatment, subjects
behave according to the following proposition
Proposition 2.
1. For all i with τi = 1 si = {1, x, , y, 1, 1}x, y ∈ [0, 1] (full disclosure).
2. For all i with τi = −1 there exist values d” > d′ such that:
(a) if d ≤ d′ then si = {0, 0, 0, w, x} w, x ∈ [0, 1] if d ≤ d′, (no disclosure)
(b) if d ≥ d” then si = {1, y, z, 1, 1} y, z ∈ [0, 1] if d ≥ d” (full disclosure)
(c) if d′ < d < d” thensi = {x1, x2, x3, x4, , x5}, x1, x2, x3, x4, , x ∈ [0, 1] , x1 + x2 + x3 >
0, x1 + x4+, x5 < 3 (partial disclosure).
Proof. Part 1. The result for individuals with τi = 1 directly follows by the consideration
that their expected utility is increasing in the probability of the privacy shock. It is directly
verifiable that si = {1, x, , y, 1, 1} is maximizing the probability of privacy shock for any value
of x. Then in the following we will use that si = {1, x, , y, 1, 1} ∀ i s.t. τi = 1.
Part 2. Then we can focus our attention on individuals with τi = −1. We compute their
incentives to sell information in the second period. We consider two cases: a) a privacy breach
has occurred and b) no privacy breach has occurred. By ue (0, 1) and ue (1, 1) we denote the
expected utilities deriving from disclosing the personal information in period 2 after, respec-
tively, no disclosure and disclosure in period 1. By ue (0, 0) and ue (1, 0) we denote the expected
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utility deriving from no disclosing the personal information in period 2 after, respectively, no
disclosure and disclosure in period 1.
i) Suppose a strategy profile sˆ and that individual i disclosed her personal information in
period 1. If she receives the message “a privacy breach has occurred” she knows that a pri-
vacy shock can happen to the personal information revealed in period 1 by probability 12 . Then
ue (1, 1) = 2d− 1+ 122 β+
1− 12
2 (2b
e
i,sˆ − 1)β and ue (1, 0) = d− 12β+ 12(2bei,sˆ − 1)β. Agent i will dis-
close if and only if ue (1, 1)− ue (1, 0) = d− 12βbei,sˆ ≥ 0. If she receives the message ’no privacy
breach has occurred’ he knows that a privacy shock cannot happen to the personal information re-
vealed in period 1. Then u (1, 1) = 2d− pi2 β+ (1− pi2 )(2bi,sˆ− 1)β and u (1, 0) = d+ (2bi,sˆ− 1)β.
Agent i will disclose if and only if ue (1, 1)− ue (0, 1) = d− 12βbei,sˆ ≥ 0.
ii) Suppose a strategy profile sˆ and that individual i did not disclose her information in
period 1. After any message her expected utility from disclosure in period 2 is ue (0, 1) = d−
1
4β+
(
1− 14
)
(2bei,sˆ− 1)β, while the expected utility from no disclosure in period 2 is ue (0, 0) =
(2beisˆ − 1)β. Agent i will disclose if and only if ue (0, 1)− ue (0, 0) = d− piβbei,sˆ ≥ 0.
Note that if d ≥ d” = β 12 bei,1the disclosure is preferred in all cases in period 2 while d ≤
β 12 b
e
i,0 = d” implies that in period 2 no disclosure is preferred in all cases.
Case (a). Suppose that d ≤ β12 bei,0 = d”. It implies that in period 2 no disclosure is preferred
in all cases. Assume a strategy profile sˆ characterized by some level of disclosure in period 1,
i.e. si,1 ∈ (0, 1)and no disclosure in period 2. The expected utility from disclosing in period 1
is d− 14β+
(
1− 14
)
(2bei − 1)β while that from no disclosing im period 1 is (2bei − 1)β . Then
personal information will be disclosed in period 1 if and only if the difference between these
utilities is positive, i.e. d− 12 bei,sˆβ ≥ 0. By initial assumption (d ≤ β 12 bei,0) and the consideration
bei,sˆ > b
e
i,0 this inequality is not satisfied. Directly follows that an equilibrium strategy has to
imply no disclosure in both periods.
Case (b). Suppose d ≥ d” = β 12 bei,1. It implies that in period 2 the personal information
will be disclosed. Assume a strategy profile sˆ characterized by some level of disclosure in
period 1, i.e. si,1 ∈ (0, 1)and full disclosure in period 2. The expected utility from disclosing
in period 1 is 2d − 12β +
(
1− 12
)
(2bei,sˆ − 1)β while that from no disclosing im period 1 is d −
1
4β +
(
1− 14
)
(2bei,sˆ − 1)β . Personal information will be disclosed in period 1 if and only if the
difference between these utilities is positive, i.e. d− 12 bei,sˆβ ≥ 0. Given the initial assumption
(d ≥ β 12 bei,1) and the consideration bei,sˆ < bei,1this inequality is strictly satisfied. Directly follows
that an equilibrium strategy has to imply full disclosure in both periods.
Case (c). Suppose d′ < d < d”. A strategy profile sˆ where si = {1, y, z, 1, 1} y, z ∈ [0, 1] for
all i with τi = −1 cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, by assumption d < d” = 12βbei,1 and the
previous considerations, there is an incentive to not disclose. A strategy profile sˆ where si =
{0, 0, 0, y, z} y, z ∈ [0, 1] for all i with τi = −1 cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, by assumption
d > d′ = 12βb
e
i,0 and the previous considerations, there is an incentive to disclose.QED.
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Table 3: PROBABILITY OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE BY TREATMENT AND TEST RESULT IN
PERIOD 1
D1, D2,...,D4 are dummy variables equal to 1 when the conditions in the parentheses () are met. The variable treatment is equal to one if
the notification procedure is implemented and 0 otherwise. The variable below is equal to 1 if the individual is below the median result of
the group, and 0 otherwise (see also Table (2)). For example, D1 is equal to 1 if the individual belongs to the No Notification treatment (i.e.,
treatment=0) and is above the median (i.e., below=0). The reported descriptives represent the average of disclosure in period 1 over dummies:
it corresponds to the probability of observing an individual who discloses the information in each category.
PROBABILITY OF DISCLOSURE IN PERIOD 1
D1 (i.e. treatment=0 & below=0) 0.542
D2 (i.e. treatment=0 & below=1) 0.309
D3 (i.e. treatment=1 & below=0) 0.603
D4 (i.e. treatment=1 & below=1) 0.256
Total observations 228
Table 4: DIFFERENCES IN PROBABILITY OF DISCLOSURE BETWEEN TREATMENTS AND TEST
RESULTS IN PERIOD 1
The table reports the differences in the average probability of disclosing the information in period 1 across the different categories identified in
Table (3). The variable treatment is equal to 1 if the notification procedure is implemented, and 0 otherwise. The variable below is equal to 1 if
the individual is below the median result of the group, and 0 otherwise (see also Table (2)).
Difference TTEST PRTEST Mann-Whitney
1) Differences between treatment=1 & treatment=0 when Below=0 (i.e. D3- D1) 0.062 0.242 0.240 0.481
2) Differences between treatment=1 & treatment=0 when Below=1 (i.e. D4-D2) -0.053 0.283 0.281 0.564
1) Differences between types (i.e. Below=1 vs Below=0) when treatment=0 (i.e. D2-D1) -0.232 0.005 0.005 0.009
2) Differences between types (i.e. Below=1 vs Below=0) when treatment=1 (i.e. D4-D3) -0.348 0.000 0.001 0.001
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Table 6: PROBABILITY OF DISCLOSING IN PERIOD 2: MEAN COMPARISONS
The table reports the differences in the average probability of disclosing the information in period 2 across the different categories identified in
Table (5).
Between Treatment
Difference TTEST PRTEST Mann-Whitney
1) Breach Message when Below=0 (i.e. D11-D6) -0.015 0.415 0.413 0.827
2) Breach Message when Below=1 (i.e. D13-D8) -0.509 0.027 0.025 0.056
3) No-breach Message when Below=0 (i.e. D12-D6)a 0.051 0.156 0.151 0.307
4) No-breach Message when Below=1 (i.e. D14-D8) -0.064 0.346 0.339 0.684
Within Treatment
Difference TTEST PRTEST Mann-Whitney
5) Breach Message vs No Breach Message when Below=0 (i.e. D11-D12) -0.067 0.127 0.121 0.248
6) Breach Message vs No Breach Message when Below=1 (i.e. D13-D14) -0.444 0.094 0.079 0.176
Below=1 vs Below=0 when Breach Message is given (i.e. D13-D11) -0.600 0.004 0.006 0.013
Below=1 vs Below=0 when No-breach Message is given (i.e. D12-D14) -0.222 0.015 0.014 0.032
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Table 5: DESCRIPTIVES
D5, D6, ,...,D14 are dummy variables equal to 1 when the conditions in the parentheses () are met. Disclosure in period 2 is a dummy variable
equal to 1, if the individual revealed his personal information in the second period. The variable treatment is equal to 1 if the notification
procedure is implemented, and 0 otherwise. The variable below is equal to 1 if the individual is below the median result of the group, and 0
otherwise. The variable buy is equal to 1 when the individual bought a voucher in the first period, and 0 otherwise (see also Table (2)). For
example, D5 is equal to 1, if the individual belongs to the No-notification treatment (i.e. treatment=0), did not buy a voucher in the first period
(i.e. buy=0) and is above the median (i.e. below=0). The reported descriptives represent the average of disclosure in period 2 over dummies: it
corresponds to the probability of observing an individual who disclose the information in each of the categories.
PROBABILITY OF DISCLOSURE IN PERIOD 2
D5 (i.e. treatment=0 & buy=0 & below=0) 0.145
D6 (i.e. treatment=0 & buy=1 & below=0) 0.949
D7 (i.e. treatment=0 & buy=0 & below=1) 0.083
D8 (i.e. treatment=0 & buy=1 & below=1) 0.842
D9 (i.e. treatment=1 & buy=0 & below=0) 0.174
D10 (i.e. treatment=1 & buy=0 & below=1) 0.097
D11 (i.e. treatment=1 & buy=1 & below=0 & breach message =1) 0.933
D12 (i.e. treatment=1 & buy=1 & below=0 & no breach message=1) 1
D13 (i.e. treatment=1 & buy=1 & below=1 & breach message =1) 0.333
D14 (i.e. treatment=1 & buy=1 & below=1 & no breach message=1) 0.778
Total observations 228
22
 
